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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we propose a novel general framework for
analysing competing double auction markets that vie for
traders, who then need to choose which market to go to.
Based on this framework, we analyse the competition be-
tween two markets in detail. Speciﬁcally, we game-theoreti-
cally analyse the equilibrium behaviour of traders’ market
selection strategies and adopt evolutionary game theory to
investigate how traders dynamically change their strategies,
and thus, which equilibrium, if any, can be reached. In so
doing, we show that it is unlikely for these competing mar-
kets to coexist. Eventually, all traders will always converge
to locating themselves at one of the markets. Somewhat
surprisingly, we ﬁnd that sometimes all traders converge to
the market that charges higher fees. Thus we further ana-
lyse this phenomenon, and speciﬁcally determine the factors
that aﬀect such migration.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Exchanges, in which securities, futures, stocks and com-
modities can be traded, are becoming ever more prevalent.
Now, many of these adopt the double auction market mech-
anism which is a particular type of two-sided markets with
multiple buyers (one side) and multiple sellers (the other
side). Speciﬁcally, in such a mechanism, traders can sub-
mit oﬀers at any time in a speciﬁed trading round, and can
be matched by the market at a speciﬁed time. The ad-
vantages of this mechanism are that traders can enter the
market at any time and they can trade multiple homoge-
neous or heterogeneous items in one place without travel-
ling around several markets. In addition, this mechanism
provides high allocative eﬃciency [3]. These beneﬁts have
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led many electronic marketplaces to also use this format. For
example, Google oﬀers a DoubleClick Ad Exchange, which
is a real-time double auction market enabling large online
ad publishers, on one side, and ad networks and agencies,
on the other side, to buy and sell advertising space. How-
ever, because of the globalised economy, these markets do
not exist in isolation. Thus they compete against each other
to attract traders and make proﬁts. For example, stock ex-
changes compete to attract companies to list their stocks
in their marketplaces and Google competes against Yahoo!
in order to obtain a large share of the display advertising
market. Thus such competition is becoming an increasingly
important area of research. Given this, and in order to pro-
mote further research on this issue, an annual Market Design
Competition (CAT) was introduced as part of the Trading
Agent Competition (TAC) [4]. In this, entrants need to de-
sign eﬀective market policies and set appropriate fees to at-
tract traders and so make proﬁts. Against this background,
this paper adopts a game-theoretic approach to analyse the
equilibrium behaviour of the strategies that traders should
use to select which marketplace to enter and to determine
how competing markets should set appropriate fees to obtain
market share and make proﬁts.
In more detail, when markets compete against each other,
traders usually choose the market which maximises their
proﬁts. Speciﬁcally, in an environment with multiple com-
peting two-sided markets, buyers will prefer markets with
more sellers and sellers will prefer markets with more buy-
ers. This is referred to as a positive network externality
[2], by which, on average, buyers(sellers) receives higher
proﬁts in the market which has the larger number of sell-
ers(buyers) since a large number of sellers(buyers) gives the
buyers(sellers) access to more choices. Thus when two-sided
markets compete with each other, they need to try to attract
traders on both sides. However, this gives rise to a “chicken
and egg” problem: to attract buyers, a market should have
a large base of the sellers, but these will be willing to par-
ticipate in the market only if they expect many buyers to
show up.
In order to analyse this problem, a number of theoret-
ical models have been proposed [1, 2, 8]. These models
analyse how the two-sided markets set appropriate fees to
compete eﬀectively to attract traders. However, in these
works, they usually assume that buyers(sellers) are homoge-
neous and they adopt the same strategy to choose a market.
They also assume that transaction prices are the same for
all transactions. However, such assumptions are unrealistic.
In real-world markets, traders are usually heterogeneous asthey are likely to have diﬀerent private values
1. In addi-
tion, transaction prices are usually not ﬁxed, as they are
usually determined by current demand and supply. Both
of these factors typically result in diﬀerent proﬁts for the
traders and so cause diﬀerent market selection strategies.
Furthermore, when transaction prices are aﬀected by de-
mand and supply, in addition to the positive network ex-
ternality of buyers(sellers) preferring the market with more
sellers(buyers), there also exists a negative network exter-
nality. For example, buyers will prefer market with fewer
buyers since this decreased demand decreases transaction
prices, and thus brings more proﬁts for them. In our work,
we will consider all these factors and thus we are the ﬁrst
to do so from a theoretical perspective. The other strand
of work that explores this area is primarily related to CAT,
but is largely empirical in nature. In [9], a simple game-
theoretic model was proposed to analyse market selection,
but this model assumes a game with complete information
about the traders’ preferences. In [5], researchers theoreti-
cally analyse how competing sellers set their reserve prices
to attract traders. However, in their analysis, there is only
one seller in each market (i.e. a single-sided market). Thus
this work is also not relevant for our setting.
Against this background, in this paper, we analyse compe-
tition between double auction markets in a game-theoretic
way. Speciﬁcally, we consider heterogeneous traders with
diﬀerent private values and a discriminatory pricing policy
where transaction prices will be aﬀected by current demand
and supply. This setting results in both negative and posi-
tive externalities, and we will analyse how these externalities
aﬀect traders’ market selections.
In particular, this paper advances the state of the art
in the following ways. First, we propose a novel general
framework for analysing competing double auction markets,
and in doing so, introduce a general equation to calculate a
trader’s expected utility. Second, we formulate the trader’s
expected utility equation given a speciﬁc market setting, and
then game-theoretically analyse the equilibrium behaviour
of traders’ market selection strategies in the two competing
markets environment with incomplete information. Third,
we further analyse how traders dynamically change their
market selection strategies and which of the equilibria can
be reached using evolutionary game theory (EGT) [10]. We
show that it is unlikely for these competing markets to co-
exist, and all traders will always converge to one of the
markets. Counter-intuitively, we ﬁnd that sometimes all
traders converge to the market charging higher fees. This
means that the market can maintain both high number of
traders and high proﬁts. We then analyse this interesting
phenomenon in detail. Speciﬁcally, we analyse in what sit-
uations traders migrate to the market charging higher fees
and what factors can aﬀect this migration.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we
describe our general framework. In Section 3, we analyse the
equilibrium behaviour of traders’ market selection strategies.
In Section 4, we use EGT to analyse the dynamics of traders’
selection strategies and investigate the relationship between
traders’ migration and market fees. Finally, we conclude in
Section 5.
1The private value of a buyer is its limit price which is the highest
price that it is willing to buy the item for, and the private value of
a seller is its cost price which is the lowest price that it is willing to
sell the item for.
2. GENERAL FRAMEWORK
In this section, we start by introducing basic notations of
our framework. Then we introduce the markets and their
policies. Finally, we describe the market selection strategies
in detail and give a general equation for a trader’s expected
utility.
2.1 Preliminaries
In this framework we assume that there are a set of buy-
ers, B = {1,2,...B}, and a set of sellers, S = {1,2,...S}.
Each buyer and seller has a type
2, which is denoted as θ
b
and θ
s respectively. We assume that types of all buyers are
independently drawn from the same cumulative distribution
function F
b, with support [l,¯ l], and the types of all sellers are
independently drawn from the cumulative distribution func-
tion F
s, with support [c,¯ c]. The distributions F
b and F
s are
assumed to be common knowledge and diﬀerentiable. The
probability density functions are f
b and f
s respectively. In
our framework, the type of each speciﬁc trader is not known
to the other traders and markets, and only the type distribu-
tion functions are public. In addition, we assume that there
is a set of competing markets M = {1,2,...M}, that oﬀer
places for trade and provide a matching service between the
buyers and sellers.
2.2 Markets and Fees
Since we consider marketplaces to be commercial enterprises
that seek to make a proﬁt, we assume they charge fees for
their service as match makers. The fee structure of a mar-
ket m is deﬁned, as per CAT, as Pm = (p
b
m,p
s
m,q
b
m,q
s
m),
p
b
m,p
s
m ≥ 0 and q
b
m,q
s
m ∈ [0,1], where p
b
m, p
s
m are ﬁxed
ﬂat fees (such as registration fees) charged to buyers and
sellers respectively, and q
b
m, q
s
m are percentage fees charged
on proﬁts made by buyers and sellers respectively (in the
following, we refer to such fees as proﬁt fees). Then the
fees of all competing markets constitute the fee system P =
(P1,P2,...PM). Furthermore, the transaction price of a suc-
cessful transaction in market m is determined by a parame-
ter km ∈ [0,1], i.e. a discriminatory k-pricing policy, which
sets the transaction price of a matched buyer and seller at
the point determined by km in the interval between their
oﬀers. The pricing parameters of all markets constitute the
pricing system K = (k1,k2,...,kM).
2.3 Trader Market Selection
We assume that traders can only choose a single market at a
time (called single-homing), but they can freely migrate to a
diﬀerent market in the next trading round. A trading round
proceeds as follows. First, all markets publish their fees and
pricing parameters. Second, based on the observed fees and
pricing parameters, each trader selects a market according
to its market selection strategy. Third, traders submit their
oﬀers according to their bidding strategies. Finally, after
all traders have submitted their oﬀers, the market matches
buyers and sellers and then executes transactions. For sim-
plicity, we assume that only one unit of commodity can be
traded by each trader in a giving trading round. Intuitively,
we can see that traders’ choice of markets is important since
this signiﬁcantly aﬀects the markets’ positions in the compe-
tition. Given this, in the following, we present the traders’
market selection strategies in more detail.
2The types of buyers and sellers represent the buyers’ limit prices and
the sellers’ cost prices respectively.We consider a mixed market selection strategy, where each
market is selected with some probability. A pure strategy
can be regarded as a degenerate case of a mixed strategy,
where the particular pure strategy is selected with proba-
bility 1 and every other strategy with probability 0. Now,
a mixed market selection strategy of buyer i is deﬁned as
ω
b
i : [l,¯ l] × M → [0,1], which means the probability that
buyer i with type θ
b chooses the market m is ω
b
i(θ
b,m),
where
P
m∈M ω
b
i(θ
b,m) ≤ 1. Here, 1 −
P
m∈M ω
b
i(θ
b,m) is
the probability that buyer i with type θ
b chooses no mar-
ket. The complete mixed market selection strategy of buyer
i with type θ
b is given by:
δ
b
i(θ
b) = hω
b
i(θ
b,1),ω
b
i(θ
b,2),...ω
b
i(θ
b,M)i, δ
b
i(θ
b) ∈ ∆,
where ∆ is the set of all possible mixed strategies of a trader:
∆ =
(
hx1,...,xMi ∈ [0,1]
M :
m=M X
m=1
xm ≤ 1
)
Similarly, we use ω
s
j : [c,¯ c]×M → [0,1] to deﬁne the prob-
ability of selecting a market of seller j, and write the com-
plete strategy as δ
s
j(θ
s) = hω
s
j(θ
s,1),ω
s
j(θ
s,2),...ω
s
j(θ
s,M)i,
δ
s
j(θ
s) ∈ ∆.
Now we use δ
b = hδ
b
1(·),δ
b
2(·),...δ
b
B(·)i to denote the strat-
egy proﬁle of buyers, and δ
s = hδ
s
1(·),δ
s
2(·),...δ
s
S(·)i that of
the sellers. Furthermore, we use δ
b
−i to represent the strat-
egy proﬁle of all buyers except for buyer i, and use δ
s
−j to
represent the strategy proﬁle of all sellers except for seller
j. Then δ
b and δ
s can be rewritten as δ
b = hδ
b
i,δ
b
−ii and
δ
s = hδ
s
j,δ
s
−ji. Given a buyers’ strategy proﬁle δ
b and a
sellers’ strategy proﬁle δ
s, the expected utility of a buyer i
with type θ
b is deﬁned by:
˜ U
b
i (P,K,hδ
b
i,δ
b
−ii,δ
s,θ
b) =
m=M X
m=1
ω
b
i(θ
b,m) × ˜ U
b
i,m(P,K,hδ
b
i,δ
b
−ii,δ
s,θ
b) (1)
where ˜ U
b
i,m(P,K,hδ
b
i,δ
b
−ii,δ
s,θ
b) is buyer i’s expected utility
if it chooses to trade in the market m, which depends on
the speciﬁc matching policy adopted by market m. We will
detail this equation in the next section where we consider a
particular market setting. The expected utility of the sellers
is deﬁned analogously.
3. GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS
In the above we have speciﬁed a general framework for ana-
lysing competing double auction markets. Before we can
theoretically analyse the competition between these mar-
kets, we ﬁrst need to specify the bidding strategies adopted
by traders and the matching policies adopted by the mar-
kets. Since our main focus is to analyse how competing mar-
kets with diﬀerent fees and pricing parameters aﬀect traders’
market selections, and thus we consider a simple bidding
strategy for traders. Speciﬁcally, we assume that traders
use a truthtelling bidding strategy, which means they will
submit their types as their oﬀers during the trading process.
For the matching policy, we consider equilibrium matching
since this aims to maximise traders’ proﬁts and thus max-
imises the allocative eﬃciency for the market. In detail, this
policy will match the buyer with v-th highest limit price
with the seller with v-th lowest cost price if the seller’s cost
price is not greater than the buyer’s limit price.
In the following, we will ﬁrst derive the traders’ expected
utilities for the above setting and then analyse the equi-
librium behaviour of the traders’ market selections. Since
the trader’s market selection strategy is aﬀected by other
traders’ selection strategies and furthermore, there is in-
complete information about other traders’ types, the Bayes-
Nash equilibrium (BNE) solution concept, in which each
player’s strategy maximises its expected utility given other
players’ strategies, is appropriate to deﬁne this equilibrium
behaviour.
3.1 A Trader’s Expected Utility
In what follows, we assume a trader’s expected utility only
depends on its type and whether it is a buyer or a seller. Fur-
thermore, we are interested in calculating symmetric BNEs,
as is common in game theory, and so we can assume that
(in equilibrium) traders with the same type will employ the
same strategy. Thus in the following equations, we omit
the index i when it is intuitively clear. We now calculate
the trader’s expected utility given the fee system P, pricing
system K and the market selection strategies of the other
traders. In the following, we give the equations for a buyer,
but the seller’s expected utility is calculated analogously.
According to Equation 1, we need to calculate the trader’s
expected utility in each market, which depends on the type
distribution function of traders in this market. To this end,
we derive the type distribution function in market m as fol-
lows. Firstly, the probability that the type of a buyer is less
than θ
b in the market m is:
H
b
m(θ
b) =
Z θb
l
f
b(x) ∗ ω
b(x,m)dx (2)
Then, to obtain a proper type distribution function of buyers
in market m, we need to normalise the above equation:
G
b
m(θ
b) =
H
b
m(θ
b)
Hb
m(¯ l)
(3)
Furthermore, the probability density function of buyer types
is:
g
b
m(θ
b) =
f
b(θ
b) ∗ ω
b(θ
b,m)
Hb
m(¯ l)
(4)
In addition, we can see that the prior probability that a
buyer will choose market m is given by H
b
m(¯ l). The equa-
tions of the sellers can be derived in the same way.
Now, we calculate the probabilities that there are exactly
τ
b buyers (excluding the buyer itself) and τ
s sellers choosing
market m, which are given by the binomial distributions:
ρ
b
m(τ
b) =
 
B − 1
τb
!
∗
“
H
b
m(¯ l)
”τb
∗
“
1−H
b
m(¯ l)
”B−1−τb
(5)
ρ
s
m(τ
s) =
 
S
τs
!
∗
“
H
s
m(¯ c)
”τs
∗
“
1 − H
s
m(¯ c)
”S−τs
(6)
In the equilibrium matching policy, the market matches the
buyer with the v-th highest limit price with the seller with
the v-th lowest cost price. Therefore, we need to calculate
the probability that a certain trader is at a certain position.
When τ
b + 1 buyers choose market m, the probability that
the buyer with type θ
b is the v-th (v = 1,...,τ
b + 1) highestis given by:
Pr
b
m(v|θ
b) =
 
τ
b
v − 1
!
∗
“
1−G
b
m(θ
b)
”v−1
∗
“
G
b
m(θ
b)
”τb+1−v
(7)
Similarly, the probability that the seller’s type θ
s is v-th
(v = 1,...,τ
s) lowest among τ
s sellers in market m is given
by:
Pr
s
m(v|θ
s) =
 
τ
s − 1
v − 1
!
∗
“
G
s
m(θ
s)
”v−1
∗
“
1 − G
s
m(θ
s)
”τs−v
(8)
Furthermore, the prior probability that a seller is the v-th
lowest is given by:
Pr
s(v) =
Z ¯ c
c
Pr
s
m(v|θ
s) ∗ g
s
m(θ
s)dθ
s (9)
Now using Bayes’ theorem, we can calculate the probability
density function of a seller at position v:
g
s
m(θ
s|v) =
Pr
s
m(v|θ
s) ∗ g
s
m(θ
s)
Prs(v)
(10)
At this moment, we can get the buyer’s expected gross proﬁt
(without subtracting fees) in market m:
˜ Λ
b
m(P,K,δ
b,δ
s,θ
b) =
"B−1 X
τb=0
ρ
b
m(τ
b) ∗
τb+1 X
v=1
Pr
b
m(v|θ
b)∗
„ S X
τs=v
ρ
s
m(τ
s) ∗
Z θb
c
km ∗ (θ
b − θ
s) ∗ g
s
m(θ
s|v)dθ
s
«#
(11)
where θ
b−θ
s is called the trading surplus, and km∗(θ
b−θ
s)
is the share of the buyer’s surplus. By adding the ﬁxed ﬂat
fee and proﬁt fee from market m, a buyer’s expected utility
in this market becomes:
˜ U
b
m(P,K,δ
b,δ
s,θ
b) = ˜ Λ
b
m(P,K,δ
b,δ
s,θ
b) ∗ (1 − q
b
m) − p
b
m (12)
The above equations give the expected utility in a particular
market. Therefore, given the market selection strategy, a
buyer’s expected utility is:
˜ U
b(P,K,δ
b,δ
s,θ
b) =
M X
m=1
ω
b(θ
b,m) ∗ ˜ U
b
m(P,K,δ
b,δ
s,θ
b) (13)
3.2 Market Selection Strategy Equilibria
With the equations for the traders’ expected utilities es-
tablished, we are now ready to analyse the market selec-
tion equilibrium behaviour of traders. To do so, we use
the game-theoretic concept of mixed Bayes-Nash equilibrium
(BNE). We consider the equilibrium behaviour of both buy-
ers and sellers simultaneously. Formally, the mixed Bayes-
Nash equilibrium in our setting is deﬁned as:
Deﬁnition Given the fee system P and pricing system K,
market selection strategy proﬁles δ
b∗ and δ
s∗ constitute a
mixed Bayes-Nash equilibrium, if
∀i ∈ B,∀θ
b ∈ [l,¯ l],∀δ
b
i(θ
b) ∈ ∆ :
˜ U
b
i (P,K,hδ
b∗
i ,δ
b∗
−ii,δ
s∗,θ
b)≥ ˜ U
b
i (P,K,hδ
b
i,δ
b∗
−ii,δ
s∗,θ
b)
and∀j ∈ S,∀θ
s ∈ [c, ¯ c],∀δ
s
j(θ
s) ∈ ∆ :
˜ U
s
j (P,K,δ
b∗,hδ
s∗
j ,δ
s∗
−ji,θ
s)≥ ˜ U
s
j (P,K,δ
b∗,hδ
s
j,δ
s∗
−ji,θ
s)
As we said before, in this paper, we focus on the sym-
metric BNE which means that traders with the same type
will adopt the same strategy in equilibrium. Furthermore,
in order to get insights from this complicated game with
more traders and more types, we make several simplifying
assumptions. First of all, we initially restrict our analysis
to two buyers and two sellers, i.e. B = S = 2, (although we
will relax this in Section 4.2), and only consider the competi-
tion between two markets, i.e. M = 2. In addition, to allow
for tractable results, at this stage, we restrict our analysis
to discrete trader types (we intend to analyse continuous
types in future work). In particular, we assume that there
are two types of buyers and two types of sellers: rich and
poor, which are denoted by t
b
2 and t
b
1 respectively for buyers,
and t
s
1 and t
s
2 for sellers. A rich buyer is deﬁned as having
a higher limit price than a poor buyer, i.e. t
b
2 > t
b
1, and a
rich seller is deﬁned as having a lower cost price than a poor
seller, i.e. t
s
1 < t
s
2. Trader types are independently drawn
from the discrete uniform distribution (i.e. both types are
equally likely). In addition, for simplicity, we only consider
proﬁt fee at this stage
3, i.e. p
b
1 = p
b
2 = p
s
1 = p
s
2 = 0. Given
this, traders will always choose one of the markets since no
ﬁxed ﬂat fee is charged and they have non-negative proﬁts.
Thus ω
b(θ
b,1) = 1 − ω
b(θ
b,2) and similar for sellers.
Given these assumptions, we now investigate the traders’
market selection equilibrium behaviour. Intuitively, we can
see that all traders selecting one market constitutes a pure
strategy BNE, since given all other traders selecting one
market, the best response of a trader is also to select this
market (otherwise they will have nobody to trade with). In
addition to the pure strategy BNEs, we are also interested
in the mixed symmetric BNE of traders’ market selection
strategies since we would like to know whether two compet-
ing markets can coexist. To do so, we ﬁrst need to adapt
Equation 12 to a discrete probability distribution. This is
straightforward and because of space limitations, we will
not show this in detail. As we know, in the mixed Nash
equilibrium, a player should be indiﬀerent to choosing each
pure strategy, i.e. its expected utility for each pure strategy
should be the same [6]. Thus we get the following equations
to calculate the mixed BNE:
˜ U
b
1(P,K,δ
b,δ
s,t
b
2) = ˜ U
b
2(P,K,δ
b,δ
s,t
b
2) (14)
˜ U
b
1(P,K,δ
b,δ
s,t
b
1) = ˜ U
b
2(P,K,δ
b,δ
s,t
b
1) (15)
˜ U
s
1(P,K,δ
b,δ
s,t
s
1) = ˜ U
s
2(P,K,δ
b,δ
s,t
s
1) (16)
˜ U
s
1(P,K,δ
b,δ
s,t
s
2) = ˜ U
s
2(P,K,δ
b,δ
s,t
s
2) (17)
We can use a mathematical tool, such as Matlab or Mathe-
matica, to solve the above quadratic equations with four un-
known variables: ω
b(t
b
1,1), ω
b(t
b
2,1), ω
s(t
s
1,1) and ω
s(t
s
2,1).
If the solution is in the range [0,1], then this constitutes a
mixed symmetric BNE.
By analysing the above equations, we ﬁnd that the solu-
tion such that
ω
b(t
b
1,1) = ω
b(t
b
2,1) (18)
and
ω
s(t
s
1,1) = ω
s(t
s
2,1) (19)
always exists. This means that there always exists a mixed
BNE whereby buyers adopt the same mixed strategy no mat-
ter whether they are rich or poor, and the same for sellers.
This appears somewhat counter-intuitive and so we analyse
3This is similar to recent years’ CAT competition, where most com-
peting markets only charge proﬁt fees, and charge no ﬁxed ﬂat fees
in order to avoid negative proﬁts for traders.αb
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Figure 1: The mixed BNE strategy of buyers.
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Figure 2: The mixed BNE strategy of sellers.
this solution in more detail to understand more about the
traders’ equilibrium behaviour.
To this end, we introduce two new notations, αb and αs,
where αb =
k2∗(1−qb
2)
k1∗(1−qb
1) and αs =
(1−k2)∗(1−qs
2)
(1−k1)∗(1−qs
1), to represent
the buyers’ proﬁt ratio and the sellers’ proﬁt ratio in market
2 compared to market 1 respectively. We can see that αb >
0, αs > 0, and they can be chosen independently. Using
these notations, Equations 14-17 can be rewritten to the
following two equations:
2 ∗ ωs(ts
1, 1) −
“
ωs(ts
1, 1)
”2
− ωb(tb
1, 1) ∗ ωs(ts
1, 1) + ωb(tb
1, 1) ∗
“
ωs(ts
1, 1)
”2
=
»
1 − ωs(ts
1, 1) + ωb(tb
1, 1) ∗ ωs(ts
1, 1) − ωb(tb
1, 1) ∗
“
ωs(ts
1, 1)
”2
–
∗αb (20)
2 ∗ ωb(tb
1, 1) −
“
ωb(tb
1, 1)
”2
− ωb(tb
1, 1) ∗ ωs(ts
1, 1) + ωs(ts
1, 1) ∗
“
ωb(tb
1, 1)
”2
=
»
1 − ωb(tb
1, 1) + ωb(tb
1, 1) ∗ ωs(ts
1, 1) − ωs(ts
1, 1) ∗
“
ωb(tb
1, 1)
”2
–
∗αs (21)
Note that the solution of the above two equations depends
on the proﬁt ratio parameters αb and αs. Given this, the
resulting mixed BNEs are shown in Figures 1 and 2. Specif-
ically, we ﬁnd that there exist equilibria in which traders
have a higher probability of choosing market 1 even when it
allocates less proﬁt to them. This is because when initially
more sellers stay in market 1, then buyers prefer to choose
market 1 even though it allocates less proﬁt to them, and
they still have same expected utilities in markets 1 and 2.
Vice versa for sellers. This implies that it is possible for
traders to be maintained in the market charging higher fees.
In Section 4.2, we will analyse this phenomenon in detail.
4. EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS
In the above, we analysed the traders’ equilibrium behaviour
with regards to market selection strategies and showed that
there exist at least three BNEs: all traders choosing mar-
ket 1 or 2 and the mixed BNE. However, such equilibria
only provide a static explanation for why populations play-
ing BNE strategies remain in that state since each pop-
ulation makes a best response to the other populations’
strategies. Therefore, this solution concept fails to indicate
whether the BNE can be reached and which of these equi-
libria is most likely to occur in practice. To overcome this,
in what follows, we use evolutionary game theory (EGT) to
analyse this game. EGT is diﬀerent from traditional game
theory because it focuses on the dynamic change of strate-
gies rather than the static properties of Nash equilibria [10].
In EGT, players gradually adjust their strategies over time
in response to the repeated observation of their opponents’
strategies. In particular, the replicator dynamics equation is
often used to specify the dynamic adjustment of the proba-
bility of which pure strategy should be played. For example,
in [7], replicator dynamics are used to show how traders bid
in a double auction market. However, existing literature
only provides single or 2-population replicator dynamics. In
our work, we have 4 populations (rich buyers, poor buyers,
rich sellers and poor sellers). Thus ﬁrst we introduce the
4-population replicator dynamics equations which show the
dynamic changes of traders’ selection strategies with respect
to time t:
˙ ω
b(t
b
1,1) =
dω
b(t
b
1,1)
dt
(22)
=
`˜ U
b
1(P,K,δ
b,δ
s,t
b
1) − ˜ U
b(P,K,δ
b,δ
s,t
b
1)
´
∗ ω
b(t
b
1,1)
˙ ω
b(t
b
2,1) =
dω
b(t
b
2,1)
dt
(23)
=
`˜ U
b
1(P,K,δ
b,δ
s,t
b
2) − ˜ U
b(P,K,δ
b,δ
s,t
b
2)
´
∗ ω
b(t
b
2,1)
˙ ω
s(t
s
1,1) =
dω
s(t
s
1,1)
dt
(24)
=
`˜ U
s
1(P,K,δ
b,δ
s,t
s
1) − ˜ U
s(P,K,δ
b,δ
s,t
s
1)
´
∗ ω
s(t
s
1,1)
˙ ω
s(t
s
2,1) =
dω
s(t
s
2,1)
dt
(25)
=
`˜ U
s
1(P,K,δ
b,δ
s,t
s
2) − ˜ U
s(P,K,δ
b,δ
s,t
s
2)
´
∗ ω
s(t
s
2,1)
As an example, ˙ ω
b(t
b
1,1) describes how the poor buyer
with type t
b
1 changes its probability of choosing market 1.
Here, ˜ U
b
1(P,K,δ
b,δ
s,t
b
1) is the poor buyer’s expected util-
ity when choosing market 1 given other traders’ strategies,
and ˜ U
b(P,K,δ
b,δ
s,t
b
1) is the poor buyer’s overall expected
utility (see Section 3.1). In order to get the dynamics of
the strategies, we need to calculate trajectories, which indi-
cate how the mixed strategies evolve. In more detail, ini-
tially, a mixed strategy is chosen as a starting point. For
convenience, we use
`
ω
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b
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´
to
represent this starting point. The dynamics are then cal-
culated according to the above replicator equations. Ac-
cording to the dynamic changes of traders’ strategies, their
current mixed strategy can be calculated. Such calculations
are repeated until ˙ ω
b(·,1) and ˙ ω
s(·,1) become zero, at which
point, the equilibrium is reached. The replicator dynamics
show the trajectories and how they converge to an equilib-
rium. We call an equilibrium to which trajectories converge
an attractor, and call the equilibrium to which no trajecto-
ries converge a saddle point. The region where all trajecto-
ries converge to a particular equilibrium is called the basin of
attraction of this equilibrium. The basin is very useful since
its size indicates how likely the population is to converge to
that equilibrium.
4.1 Dynamics of Traders’ Market Selection
In order to visualise how trajectories converge to the equi-
librium and which equilibrium is the most likely to hap-(t)
market 2
market 1
mixed BNE
Figure 4: Equilibrium behaviour of 2 buyers and 2 sellers with three
chosen starting points.
(t)
market 2
market 1
mixed BNE
Figure 5: Equilibrium behaviour of 2 buyers and 2 sellers with start-
ing points around (0.5, 0.5, 0.5 0.5).
market 2
market 1
(0.4090, 0.4090)
Figure 3: Market selection of rich(poor) traders having the same
behaviour. The dotted line denotes the boundary between the basins
of attraction.
pen, ﬁrstly, we consider a simple case with rich(poor) buy-
ers and rich(poor) sellers having the same behaviour, which
will reduce the 4-populations replicator dynamics to the 2-
populations replicator dynamics. In this case, the market
should charge the same proﬁt fee to buyers and sellers, i.e.
q
b
1 = q
s
1, q
b
2 = q
s
2, and set transaction prices fairly to buy-
ers and sellers, i.e. k1 = k2 = 0.5. Furthermore, the sur-
plus should be symmetric. To this end, we let t
b
2 − t
s
1 = 8,
t
b
2 − t
s
2 = 5, t
b
1 − t
s
1 = 5 and t
b
1 − t
s
2 = 2, which means all
traders can make proﬁts and rich traders make more prof-
its than poor ones. Speciﬁcally, we consider 2 buyers and
2 sellers and assume αb = αs = 0.8. Then the mixed BNE
satisfying Equations 18 and 19 is (0.4090, 0.4090, 0.4090,
0.4090). The evolutionary results are shown in Figure 3,
where the x-axis is the the rich buyer(seller)’s probability of
choosing market 1, and the y-axis is the poor buyer(seller)’s
probability of choosing market 1. We ﬁnd that all traders
ﬁnally converge to market 1 or 2. We can see that the basin
of attraction to market 1 is bigger, which means that traders
have a higher probability of converging to market 1 since it
allocates more proﬁts to them. We ﬁnd that no trajectory
converges to (0.4090, 0.4090) (the solid circle in Figure 3),
i.e. the mixed BNE is a saddle point. This indicates that
this equilibrium is hard to reach in practice.
We now consider the general cases where rich(poor) traders
may not have the same behaviour. Thus we let traders have
asymmetric surpluses. In the following, we let t
b
2 − t
s
1 = 8,
t
b
2 − t
s
2 = 5, t
b
1 − t
s
1 = 4 and t
b
1 − t
s
2 = 1 unless otherwise
speciﬁed. We ﬁrstly consider the case that two competing
markets are identical, i.e. k1 = k2, q
b
1 = q
b
2 and q
s
1 = q
s
2. Ac-
cording to Equations 20 and 21, we know that (0.5, 0.5 0.5
0.5) is a mixed BNE. We now show the evolutionary results
of two representative starting points (0.6, 0.4, 0.7, 0.2), (0.1,
0.8, 0.3, 0.9) and a speciﬁc starting point (0.5, 0.5 0.5 0.5) in
Figure 4. The x-axis is the time at which the mixed strate-
gies evolve, the points at t = 0 correspond to the starting
points, from which traders evolve their strategies. As can
be seen, traders eventually converge to market 1 or 2 except
when starting at the mixed BNE. Furthermore, we analyse
the area of starting points around the equilibrium (0.5, 0.5,
0.5, 0.5) and ﬁnd that these do not converge to (0.5, 0.5,
0.5, 0.5). This is described in Figure 5, which shows the
evolutionary results where starting points are chosen from
0.499 to 0.501 with step size 0.0005. Therefore, even though
(0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5) is a mixed BNE, it is a saddle point and
unlikely to be reached in practice.
Now we consider the traders’ evolved strategies when fees
and pricing parameters are diﬀerent across markets. As an
example, we let αb = 0.8 and αs = 0.7, which means com-
pared to market 1, market 2 allocates less proﬁts to traders.
By solving Equations 20 and 21 with αb = 0.8 and αs = 0.7,
we ﬁnd one mixed BNE at (0.3679, 0.3679, 0.3994, 0.3994).
Then we show the evolutionary results of two representative
starting points (0.2, 0.4, 0.3, 0.1), (0.7, 0.9, 0.8, 0.6), and
the speciﬁc starting point (0.3679, 0.3679, 0.3994, 0.3994)
in Figure 6 and the evolutionary results with starting points
around the equilibrium (0.3679, 0.3679, 0.3994, 0.3994) in
Figure 7. We still ﬁnd that traders ﬁnally converge to either
market 1 or 2, and the mixed BNE is unlikely to occur in
practice. Furthermore, we ﬁnd the same result for a wide
range of settings, including more traders, diﬀerent starting
points and diﬀerent fees. This indicates that although there
exists a negative network externality (where a trader prefers
less traders on the same side), the positive network external-
ity (where a trader prefers more traders on the other side)
is stronger, and then pushes all traders into one market. In
addition, we ﬁnd that from the starting point (0.2, 0.4, 0.3,
0.1), traders ﬁnally converge to market 2, which is the mar-
ket allocating less proﬁts to traders. This is counter-intuitive
and we will analyse it in detail in the following.
4.2 Trader Migration and Market Fees
When analysing the dynamics of traders’ market selection
strategies, we found that traders evolving from some start-
ing points converged to the market allocating less proﬁts to
them. When k1 = k2, this phenomenon directly means that
traders may converge to the market charging a higher proﬁt
fee (we call this an expensive market, and call the market(t)
market 2
market 1
mixed BNE
Figure 6: Equilibrium behaviour of 2 buyers and 2 sellers with three
chosen starting points.
(t)
market 2
market 1
mixed BNE
Figure 7: Equilibrium behaviour of 2 buyers and 2 sellers with start-
ing points around (0.3679, 0.3679, 0.3994, 0.3994).
Figure 8: Lock-in region with 2 buyers and 2 sellers.
Figure 9: The size of lock-in region with respect to the number of
traders.
charging a lower proﬁt fee a cheap market in the following).
This somewhat counter-intuitive result is interesting since
it suggests that a competing market can maintain traders
and make proﬁts at a good level. To this end, we will hence
investigate the relationship between the traders’ migration
and market fees in detail. Such an analysis is insightful to
guide the design of charging policies in competing markets.
We ﬁrst consider the case with two buyers and two sellers
with rich and poor types respectively, but we will consider
more buyers and sellers below. For convenience of showing
results, we assume that the market charges the same proﬁt
fees to buyers and sellers, i.e. q
b
1 = q
s
1 and q
b
2 = q
s
2. We
discretize the continuous proﬁt fee from 0 and 1 with a step
size of 0.1. The traders’ evolution of their market selection
strategies depends on two factors: starting point and fees
charged to them. We now choose a starting point (0.8, 0.6,
0.7, 0.9), where the traders have a higher initial probabil-
ity of choosing market 1. Then we evolve traders’ market
selection strategies in the competing markets with diﬀerent
proﬁt fees. The results are given in Figure 8. The gray area
is what we call the “lock-in region”. This area is very inter-
esting since when the proﬁt fees charged by the two markets
are within this area, then even though market 1 charges a
higher proﬁt fee than market 2, traders still converge to mar-
ket 1. Note that when the proﬁt fee of market 2 is higher
than 70%, market 1 can no longer maintain traders if its
proﬁt fee is higher than market 2, i.e. the lock-in region
disappears. Now we can see that it is possible for traders to
converge to the expensive market if currently traders have
higher probabilities of choosing this market. Thus, in the
initial stage of the competition, a market has to lower its
fees to attract or maintain traders. After obtaining an ad-
vantageous position, the market can then increase its fees
slightly higher than its opponents, but still can keep traders
since traders still have higher expected utilities in the ex-
pensive market.
After obtaining the preliminary conclusion that it is pos-
sible for traders to stay in the expensive market, we inves-
tigate what factors can aﬀect the size of the lock-in region.
In particular, we investigate how the number of traders can
aﬀect the size of lock-in region. In the following, we calcu-
late the size of the lock-in region as the sum of the diﬀer-
ences of two markets’ discretized proﬁt fees in the lock-in
region. For example, the size of the lock-in region in Fig-
ure 8 is two
4. From Figure 9, we ﬁnd that as the number
of traders in the competing market environment increases,
the size of the lock-in region decreases, which means traders
will increasingly select cheap markets. The reason for this is
as follows. The traders’ choice of markets is determined by
their expected utilities, which, in turn, depend on two parts:
the gross proﬁt and fees charged to them (see Equation 12).
From Figure 10, we can see that as the number of traders
in the multiple competing markets environment increases,
the diﬀerence of the traders’ gross proﬁts in two markets
(i.e. Λ
b
1(·)−Λ
b
2(·), Λ
s
1(·)−Λ
s
2(·), see Equation 11) gradually
decreases. This means that the gross proﬁts of traders in
two markets gradually become closer to each other. Then
the traders’ choice of market is mainly determined by the
market fees. Thus they will increasingly choose the cheap
market. This indicates that, in a multiple competing mar-
kets context with a large number of traders, it is diﬃcult for
the market to maintain both a high number of traders and
high proﬁts. Intuitively, markets want to attract traders of
4This is the sum of discretized proﬁt fee diﬀerence of two markets:
(0.4−0.0)+(0.5−0.1)+(0.5−0.2)+(0.6−0.3)+(0.6−0.4)+(0.7−
0.5) + (0.7 − 0.6) + (0.8 − 0.7).G
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Figure 10: Diﬀerence of gross proﬁts in two markets with mixed
strategy (0.7, 0.7, 0.7, 0.7).
Figure 11: The size of lock-in region with respect to rich traders’
strategy.
a rich type since they are more likely to make transactions.
Given this, we now analyse what happens when a certain
type of trader initially has a bias towards selecting a par-
ticular market. First, we consider the rich type’s eﬀect on
the lock-in region, where we ﬁx the poor traders’ probabil-
ities of choosing market 1 to be 0.5, and then change the
strategies of the rich traders from 0.55 to 0.95 with step size
0.05. The results are shown in Figure 11. From this, we
can see that, when rich traders have a higher initial prob-
ability of selecting market 1, the size of the lock-in region
increases. This means that rich traders have a positive eﬀect
on the lock-in region. In contrast, if we ﬁx the rich traders’
probabilities of choosing market 1 to be 0.5, and then in-
crease the poor traders’ probabilities of choosing market 1
starting from 0.05, we ﬁnd no lock-in regions exist. This is
because the surpluses were chosen such that poor traders can
make relatively good proﬁts, which means they are not poor
enough. Thus we reduce the poor traders’ surpluses to en-
hance their eﬀect on the lock-in region. If we let t
b
2 −t
s
1 = 8,
t
b
2 − t
s
2 = 2, t
b
1 − t
s
1 = 1 and t
b
1 − t
s
2 = 0, we get the follow-
ing result. When the poor traders’ probability of choosing
market 1 is 0.1, the lock-in region exists and its size is 0.2.
When the probability increases to 0.2, the lock-in region dis-
appears. Thus we can see that poor traders have a negative
eﬀect on the size of the lock-in region. Furthermore, consid-
ering again Figure 9, we can see that the lines with circles
and triangles cross. This suggests that, if the proportion of
poor traders is high, and as the number of traders increases,
poor traders have an even larger negative eﬀect.
5. CONCLUSIONS
We have developed a novel general framework for theoret-
ically analysing competing markets. Based on this frame-
work, we game-theoretically analysed the static equilibrium
behaviour of traders’ market selection strategies. We then
adopted EGT to analyse the dynamics of traders’ market se-
lection strategies considering a wide range of settings. From
this, we found that traders will always converge to one mar-
ket unless they start oﬀ from the mixed BNE. This indicates
that the competing markets cannot coexist. We then ana-
lysed how market fees aﬀect traders’ migration. In so do-
ing, we found that it is possible for the competing market to
keep traders even when charging higher fees if it already has
a larger market share. We also found that, as the number
of traders increases, this becomes more diﬃcult and traders
prefer the cheaper market. We further showed that rich
traders have a positive eﬀect on a market in terms of helping
to attract traders and poor traders have a negative eﬀect.
Such insights are particularly useful to guide the compet-
ing market to set its fees. Speciﬁcally, when the competing
market obtains a larger market share with many rich traders
than its opponents, then according to the lock-in region, it
can charge slightly higher fees to earn high proﬁt, but still
keep traders. In contrast, for the market with smaller mar-
ket share and poor traders, it should lower its fees to“escape”
from the lock-in region.
In the future, we would like to generalise our analysis of
the market selection equilibrium behaviour as well as the
bidding strategies by considering traders with continuous
types. Furthermore, at present, we have assumed that the
competing markets use the same matching technology. How-
ever, in practice, they may well use diﬀerent technologies,
as we see in the CAT competition. In addition, we intend
to analyse the equilibrium behaviour of the markets them-
selves in terms of setting fees and pricing parameters taking
into account the equilibrium behaviour of traders’ market
selection strategies. We also plan to use insights from the
theoretical analysis to guide the design of a competing dou-
ble auction market for the CAT competition.
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